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Power and the Subject in J. M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians

“[P]eople forget the obvious fact that a political system can do no more than the men in it […] A system exists around the limits of what human beings can do. Nobody, for example, can spit four metres into the air, even if the system demands it. You can’t do more than half a metre. Or piss that far: even if Stalin orders it, you can’t do it. But you can kill. So the anthropological question – the question of what man is capable of – is always there behind the political one.” (Milan Kundera, interview with McEwan 33)
For those who follow the slow processes of justice worldwide, it probably came as no surprise when in 2014 Communist labour camp commander, Alexandru Visinescu, responded to charges of “crimes against humanity over conditions at [a] brutal prison for Romanian political detainees” with the claim that “he is innocent and was only obeying orders” (“‘Romanian Nuremberg’”). Duty, as well as the legality of the framework within which actions took place, was also invoked by President FW de Klerk in his submission to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: “Many of those who fought on the side of the security forces, particularly national servicemen and reservists,” he wrote, “often did so without any specific ideological or party-political motive. They believed that it was their duty to carry out the instructions of a legally constituted and internationally recognized government.” More recently, President George W Bush signed into law the Military Commissions Act, which “creates a legal defence against lawsuits for misconduct arising from the detention and interrogation of aliens between September 11, 2001 and December 30, 2005” (Sands 281) at Guantánamo Bay, explaining that it provides “‘legal protections that ensure our military and intelligence personnel will not have to fear lawsuits filed by terrorists simply for doing their jobs’” (qtd. in Sands 281). Phrases such as “obeying orders” and “doing their jobs” and the notion of duty displace responsibility from individuals onto the system or the political regime within which they function: they deny the subject both impetus (De Klerk’s ideological motivation) and agency (Visinescu’s and Bush’s rejection of individual responsibility). However, as Judith Butler’s reading of Althusser’s problem of subjection reveals, mastering the skills and tasks of a particular order means, at the same time, a submission to its rules; the actions of those who work on behalf of the state are therefore steeped in ideology. If neither “submission nor mastery is performed by a subject” (Psychic Life 116), as Butler claims, then this suggests that the subject does not exist outside of, or prior to, the mastering of skills or the subjection to the ruling ideology; subjectivation inaugurates the subject in ideology. De Klerk’s “national servicemen and reservists” and Bush’s “military and intelligence personnel,” in the performance of their duties, thus reveal their interpellation by the dominant discourse; the subject emerges as the embodiment of the rules of ideology.
The social constitution of the subject raises the vexed question of agency, which ultimately is also a question of power. Hannah Arendt, in her investigation into post-war Germany’s reluctance to judge Nazi collaborators, interrogates the “suspicion” in totalitarian societies “that no one is a free agent, and hence the doubt that anyone is responsible or could be expected to answer for what he has done” (Responsibility 19). Indeed, the notion of capability – Kundera’s “what human beings can do” – does not fully explain agency: ability does not and cannot always translate into action. Existence is after all essentially social, and the subject will be constrained by the norms and values, expressed as legal and moral considerations, of society. The ambiguity inherent in the notion of subjectivation, of the subject as socially constituted, however, suggests that the very power that dominates the subject is also that which animates it. In Butler’s words, “Subjection consists precisely in this fundamental dependency on a discourse we never chose but that, paradoxically, initiates and sustains our agency” (Psychic Life 2). While pronouncements on questions of guilt and accountability in these real world scenarios lie beyond the purview of the literary critic, literature is uniquely suited to stage the possibilities for agency. As in the courtroom where a single person, and not the system, is on trial, literature is concerned with the individual. Jonathan Culler in his reading of Steven Knapp’s work argues that, in the novel, the individual character’s relation to the dominant discourses or norms and values is both singular and exemplary: “To understand myself as an agent is to see myself both in a concrete situation determined by my particular past and to consider alternative courses of action by debating what it is appropriate for someone in my situation to do and thus to consider choices open to a certain type of agent – a type of which I am only one possible example.” The “idea of full agency” – presumably Culler here suggests an agent that can act as a catalyst for social change – “is that of the fusion of particularity and generality” (281). However, Culler’s formulation here pits a seemingly already-existing subject against external norms, not accounting for the normative framework that allows the socially constituted subject to appear or to be recognized. I argue, therefore, that literature’s “radical potential of disruption of meanings” (281) lies rather in its contestation of certain ontological givens within the framework of the dominant discourse.
Given this crucial distinction, then, through a reading of J. M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians, this essay examines the functioning of power in creating the subjects it needs to maintain itself within what Giorgio Agamben terms the state of exception as well as concomitant possibilities for agency and individual responsibility. Admittedly, it is impossible to discuss the latter without mentioning the Levinasian obligation that is the basis of a non-appropriative encounter with alterity, represented in the figure of the barbarian girl, which a number of Coetzee scholars have written on with commendable depth.​[1]​ However, rather than focus on the Magistrate-narrator’s interaction with the girl, inarguably crucial to his awakening to the state’s normative horizon and its political grammar, my concern is with the relationship between Empire and its agents, including the Magistrate and Colonel Joll. With this in mind, this essay aims to contribute to the existing conversation on the nature of political power, its agents, and individual agency as bookended by two works: in an article published in 1986, Stephen Watson, drawing on Albert Memmi’s formulation, identifies the Magistrate (and Coetzee himself) as a dissenting colonizer, the “colonizer who refuses”: “all Coetzee’s major protagonists,” he writes, “are colonizers who wish to elude at almost any cost their historical role as colonizers. All of them are wrought to a pitch of desperation in their efforts to escape the intolerable burdens of the master-slave relationship” (378).​[2]​ Like Watson’s, this essay explores the “type of psyche, the psychology” (370) dictated by historical reality, especially in the subject who finds himself subordinated by an objectionable law; unlike Watson, however, whose emphasis is on the neuroses resulting from the impossibility of action in an oppressively over-determined historical context, my argument hinges on a fundamental tension in the subjectivation staged in Waiting for the Barbarians: Colonel Joll’s turn toward the law in response to an interpellative call that requires the torture and mistreatment of the barbarians is an obvious acquiescence to power, but is the Magistrate-narrator’s misrecognition of himself in its hailing at all subversive? As discursively constituted subjects, are our only available options to turn either towards the law or away from the law, or is there a possibility of challenging the law itself?  In staging the relationship between Empire and a narrator who finds himself on the side of power, Coetzee’s novel, I argue, anticipates and complicates Butler’s thinking on a critical desubjectivation and the potential for agency to exceed and subvert the interpellations of the dominant discourse.​[3]​ My focus is thus twofold: on Colonel Joll as an active agent and on the Magistrate as a complicit subject of Empire and their roles in creating or subverting the state’s construction of its objective enemies. My analysis of the novel’s staging of the discursive operations of an authoritarian state in constructing and interpellating its subjects (and its non-subjects, its others) – its emphasis on the writing and reading of codes of power, as it were – brings me to Robert Spencer’s argument, in “J. M. Coetzee and Colonial Violence,” that “novels like Coetzee’s engender a critical and ultimately moral and political response [also] to contemporary imperialism” (176).​[4]​ In its concluding arguments, this essay will make a claim for the role of the hospitable reader and the ethical and political potential of Waiting for the Barbarians.
The novel opens with the military’s assumption of emergency powers ostensibly to face an insurrection by the barbarians. The Third Bureau of the Civil Guard arrives at the frontier to investigate the rumour that the “barbarian tribes were arming … the Empire should take precautionary measures, for there would certainly be war” (8). Coetzee thus creates the scene for the justified suspension of the rule of law in the name of security, suggesting why this novel, set in an unspecified time and place, is so often read as an allegory of either apartheid South Africa (see David Attwell’s J. M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing) or of the war on terror (Robert Spencer’s Cosmopolitan Criticism) and their governments’ rationales for constricting civil liberties.​[5]​ In trying to convince the South African public of the need of extraordinary force in pursuit of the state’s enemies during the “total onslaught” era, Prime Minister Vorster defended the right of the Police “to detain people for certain periods until they have completed their investigations,” which in effect meant that many were detained indefinitely without trial. He argued that “It stands to reason that in any civilised country of the world one wants to bring people to court as soon as possible … but you must remember that people engaged in this kind of activity have sometimes put months and years into planning their actions and one cannot expect where this is the case to be able, as in the normal processes of the law, to charge people within 48 hours” (275; my emphasis).​[6]​ Vorster concluded by referring to what is ostensibly the state’s ultimate goal: “when it comes to the security of the State, this Government is not prepared to take risks” (275). In language not dissimilar to the rhetoric of the apartheid state, the United States government cited “military necessity” as justification for the use of aggressive interrogation techniques on detainees – identified as terror suspects by the government – at Guantánamo Bay. The journalist Philippe Sands summarizes the main argument of the government’s “Legal Review of Interrogation Techniques”: “The common theme was that the techniques were fine ‘so long as the force used could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation to achieve a legitimate government objective, and it was applied in a good faith effort and not maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm’” (280). This leads him to comment, somewhat wryly, “That is to say, the techniques are legal if the motivation is pure. National security justifies everything” (280). The link between the state of exception in both the manifestations of colonialism and contemporary imperialism is made explicit by Coetzee’s narrator in Diary of a Bad Year (who is also, within the fiction, the author of a novel called Waiting for the Barbarians). He comments to an Australian newspaper on the activities of the apartheid state – such as arresting journalists who report on the disappearance of torture suspects for endangering the security of the state – which seems to be copied by several Western powers in their “war on terror”: “‘I used to think that the people who created these laws that effectively suspended the rule of law were moral barbarians. Now I know they were just pioneers, ahead of their time’” (171).
Significantly, Coetzee situates the action of Waiting for the Barbarians in a frontier settlement, a literal manifestation of the state’s politics of inclusion and exclusion. This remote outpost signals both the beginning and the end of the Empire; it represents a “zone of indistinction” (to use Giorgio Agamben’s phrase): on the one hand, as the first line of defense against an attack, it is a symbol of the strength of the state to repel its enemies; on the other hand, its walls – beyond which lies the domain of the other, the unknown and unexplored territory of the barbarians – also indicate the actual border, or limits, of Empire. The temporal framework of the novel, as well as its concern with torture, further suggests that Coetzee’s focus here is on power and what Richard Barney describes as “the daunting ability of the dominant structure, once challenged, to resuscitate its familiar symbolic powers” (20). The activities of the Third Bureau signal Empire’s endgame, the last stage of the time of Empire, which is “the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe” (133). As in the Constantine Cavafy poem from which it gets title, the barbarian army of course never arrives. The state of exception, the necessity for interrogation and torture declared by Empire, is shown to be a subjective decision tied to the state’s true motivation, namely power: “One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire,” the Magistrate reflects, “how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era” (133). Coetzee’s novel thus foreshadows Agamben’s cynical judgment of the invocation of necessity in the state of exception – “the only circumstances that are necessary and objective are those that are declared to be so” (State of Exception 30) – and Butler’s identification of the state’s true motivation: “In the very act by which state sovereignty suspends the law, or contorts the law to its own uses,” she writes, “it extends its own domain, its own necessity, and develops the means by which the justification of its own power takes place” (Precarious Life 57). In the state of exception, Empire’s motivation is no longer only the exclusion of the barbarian in order to create an identity for itself, but the borrowing of the barbarian body to enforce the recognition of its power, to legitimize its authority. Based on an already existing binary of civilized/barbarian,​[7]​ the Empire now attempts to activate a security discourse based on its identification of an enemy-of-the-state. 
Objective Enemies
Apartheid’s thoroughgoing bureaucratization of difference – of which its systematic coding of all forms of oppression and dissent under the rubric of the security laws and the implementation of the so-called “total strategy” by the aptly named National Management System were just the latest expressions – is echoed in Waiting for the Barbarians’s staging of a similar organizational framework. Like the nameless Magistrate-narrator, almost all the characters in the novel are known only by their function in the machinery of Empire. The reader encounters barbarians, soldiers, cooks, and fisher folk. In the hierarchy of Empire, only Colonel Joll and Warrant Officer Mandel – officers of Third Bureau, “‘the most important division of the Civil Guard nowadays’” (2) – are named,​[8]​ hinting perhaps at the position of power they occupy: they are executioners (in more than one sense of the word) of the codes of an Empire that functions like a machine according to predetermined modes of subjectivation.
Colonel Joll makes no attempt to “‘track down thieves, bandits, invaders of the Empire’” (17), showing no interest in individual alterity or even guilt. Rather, he is in pursuit of Empire’s “objective enemies” (432), an identity established by a totalitarian regime before any question as to the behaviour of the accused has arisen at all, as Arendt writes in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Objective enemies are “persecuted not because of what they had done or thought, but because of what they unchangeably were – born into the wrong kind of race or the wrong kind of class” (Arendt 294).​[9]​ Colonel Joll arrests a number of fishermen “‘Because they were hiding.’” The “‘reasoning of a policeman!’” (18), as the Magistrate exclaims incredulously, is that “‘Prisoners are prisoners’” (22). When the Magistrate tries to plead for the boy and his uncle, asking the Colonel how “simple people like that” can be of use to him, Joll replies, “‘Nevertheless … I ought to question them’” (4, my emphasis). Their dismissive responses to the Magistrate’s objections – “We have set procedures to go through,” and “I have a commission to fulfill” (11) – suggest that they are merely automatons doing their duty, carrying out the tasks of Empire. This leads the Magistrate to question their humanity, wondering, “has the Bureau created new men who can pass without disquiet between the unclean and the clean?” (12).
The Magistrate’s inability to comprehend the behaviour of members of the Third Bureau can, on the one hand, be explained by Arendt’s claim about the SS-men of Nazi Germany: the psyche disintegrates under the pressures of extreme violence, resulting in “inanimate men … men who can no longer be psychologically understood” (The Origins 441).​[10]​ As we are confined to the Magistrate-narrator’s focalization, the reader too has no access to Joll’s thinking. This shared frustration, the inability to comprehend the reasoning of the other, foregrounds the state’s totalising reduction of the identity of its subjects. The Magistrate, in an attempt to pinpoint an external marker that would identify the members of the Third Bureau as torturers, is puzzled by the contradiction between Warrant Officer Mandel’s “clear blue eyes, the rather rigid good looks” (118) and his knowledge of the latter’s participation in barbarous acts; similarly, while listening to Colonel Joll’s explanation of how the infliction of pain extracts the truth, the Magistrate notices “his tapering fingernails, his mauve handkerchiefs, his slender feet in soft shoes” (5). These incongruities are echoed in Antjie Krog’s description in Country of My Skull, her account of the TRC hearings, of “the doers” whose “task it was to murder,” while politicians “dressed [killing] in the official pastels of ‘eliminate’, ‘remove’ or ‘take out’” (90). Krog writes of her own attempt to identify “the Face of Evil” of those accused of perpetrating human rights abuses during apartheid: “When the amnesty hearing begins, I go sit in a bench close to them. To look for signs – their hands, their fingernails, in their eyes, on their lips – signs that these are the faces of killers…” (90). However, both the Magistrate’s and Krog’s attempts are doomed to failure. There is no external evidence to mark these men as torturers; the Magistrate observes regarding Mandel, “the care of souls seems to have left no more mark on him than the care of hearts leaves on the surgeon” (118).
Colonel Joll’s rhetoric of duty, on the other hand, evokes Arendt’s argument that, when describing political systems, “it is inevitable that we speak of all persons used by the system in terms of cogs and wheels that keep the administration running. Each cog, that is, each person must be expendable without changing the system, an assumption underlying all bureaucracies, all civil services, and all functions properly speaking” (Responsibility 29). In effect, bureaucracy is therefore “the rule of nobody” (Responsibility 31): figuring individuals merely as cogs in this regime as machine metaphor denies motivation or individual responsibility; the argument can thus be too easily made that “if I had not done it, somebody else would have (Arendt, Responsibility 29). However, even if Joll is just following orders, fulfilling his duty in a legally constituted government (to echo De Klerk’s words cited earlier), his existence as a Colonel is impossible without the Empire. The same power that acts upon him also animates his actions. He is thus what Butler, in her discussion of the “modern war prison” in American politics calls a “petty sovereign” who wields sovereign power without sovereign responsibility. The state of exception collapses the distinction between sovereignty and governmentality or the separation of powers characteristic of political modernity resulting, for Butler, in the “Kafkan nightmare” of managerial officials who do not fully control the aims that animate their actions and whose actions “are not subject to review by any higher judicial authority” (Precarious Life 62): “Their acts are clearly conditioned, but their acts are judgements that are nevertheless unconditional in the sense that they are final, not subject to review, and not subject to appeal” (Precarious Life 65). 
In Waiting for the Barbarians, Colonel Joll fulfills an active role as an agent of Empire. The Magistrate’s statements that “‘There is not much crime here’” (2) and “‘normally we would not have any barbarians at all to show you’” (4) reveal his scepticism at the possibility of war. However, whether the uprising is real or not is not, in fact, Colonel Joll’s concern; rather, his function at the outpost is to activate the codes of Empire, namely to write the meaning of the barbarian as enemy through torture. The Magistrate witnesses one such scene: “The Colonel steps forward. Stooping over each prisoner in turn he rubs a handful of dust into his naked back and writes a word with a stick of charcoal. I read the words upside down: ENEMY … ENEMY … ENEMY … ENEMY” (105). The intertext at play here is Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony” in which the main characters are also known only by their titles – the Officer, the Commandant, the Condemned, the Soldier, and the Explorer. In this story, the machinations of the regime are presented in the form of a diabolical instrument that inscribes the condemned prisoner’s sentence – “Honor Thy Superiors!” (Kafka 144) – on his body until “enlightenment” takes place upon his death. Significantly, the prisoner is named the condemned and not the accused: the penal colony’s justice system is guided by the principle “Guilt is never to be doubted” (Kafka 145), and there is no opportunity for the man to defend himself. Dominic Head reads the “process of inscription” in Kafka’s story as “an expression of power,” while in Coetzee’s novel it has for him “more directly to do with identity and the interpellation of the subject (as ‘enemy’)” (77). While there is no indication that the prisoners recognize themselves as the enemies of the Empire, realizing that the interpellative hail is really addressed to them, they are still discursively constituted as subjects by a name that is literarily forced upon them.​[11]​ Colonel Joll’s identification of the barbarians as enemy for the onlookers thus enacts not only the symbolic act of inscribing the barbarian as a term – enemy – in Empire’s security discourse; it also involves the physical degradation of the prisoners who are paraded, “stark naked” (103), around the barracks square so that “everyone has a chance to see the twelve miserable captives, to prove to his children that the barbarians are real” and then are beaten with green cane staves “raising red welts on [their] backs and buttocks” (105). Empire thus creates the referents to support its rhetorical claims, in the process also derealizing the humanity of the barbarians. Its success in creating an association between the bodily ruin of the prisoners and their identification as barbarians is affirmed when a member of their own expeditionary force returns to the barracks, crucified and lashed to his horse: “Flies buzz around his face. His jaw is bound shut, his flesh is puffy, a sickly smell comes from him, he has been several days dead.” A child tugs at the Magistrate’s hand: “‘Is he a barbarian, uncle?’ he whispers” (140). 
“[R]elations in the torture room,” Coetzee claims in “Into the Dark Chamber,” an essay examining the “dark fascination” torture holds for the writer in South Africa, “provide a metaphor, bare and extreme, for relations between authoritarianism and its victims” (363). Colonel Joll wields sovereign power in demarking the space – as enemies of the state – the barbarians are forced to occupy. The torture of the Magistrate and other captives in the novel is done not as a technique of interrogation (if it ever can be considered that) but to show the might of Empire, its ability to inflict pain on its enemies: Colonel Joll’s work is “‘to find out the truth. That is all he does. He finds out the truth’” (3). His explanation of how torture “works” to obtain the truth leads the Magistrate to conclude, “Pain is truth; all else is subject to doubt” (5). Coetzee’s novel thus stages a penal process similar to the one before the panopticon described by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish, where the “visible intensity” of public torture, a “horrifying spectacle of public punishment” (9), was supposed to discourage crime. Significantly, when torture was used as penalty, the prisoner was not considered “a juridical subject, the possessor, among other rights, of the right to exist” (13). Reduced to the status of homo sacer, the barbarian prisoners, like the apartheid state’s detainees, encounter power without recourse to the rights afforded to subjects recognized by the state. They inhabit a space equivalent to Agamben’s concentration camp: “an absolute biopolitical space in which power is exercised not against juridical subjects but against biological bodies. It is, in effect, the space in which sovereignty exists but the law does not, a territory in which actions are neither legal nor illegal” (DeCaroli 53).​[12]​ This biopolitical space also reveals a truth about authoritarianism’s agents: in Empire’s torture chamber, like in Kafka’s penal colony, neither the guilt of the prisoner nor that of the torturer is of any concern. In the state of exception, and “the twilight of legal illegality” (Coetzee, “Into the Dark Chamber” 363) it creates, Colonel Joll has sovereign power without the concomitant accountability.
Complicit Subjects
While the Magistrate seems to be the only one in Waiting for the Barbarians who speaks truth to power, he admits that “wading in the ooze” (133), he too is infected by the vision of Empire, revealing the problematic of subjectivation: “the subject’s existence cannot be linguistically guaranteed without passionate attachment to the law” (Butler, Psychic Life 129). The Magistrate’s title, the only name by which he is identified in the novel, acts as a marker, a linguistic guarantee of his existence, but also, of his interpellation and implication in the power structures of the Empire. My discussion so far has focused on Empire and its avatars – in the figures of the Third Bureau – and their role in the exclusionary politics of the state of exception, but now I would like to shift my attention to the novel’s staging of the Magistrate’s realization of his subjectivation by an unacceptable law and concomitant possibilities for subverting authoritarianism’s interpellations.
Much of the Magistrate’s shame and anger in the novel is an expression of his guilt at the realization of his association with Empire. Even though he does not participate in the public humiliation and torture of the barbarians, because for “‘the duration of the emergency … the administration of justice is out of the hands of civilians and in the hands of the Bureau’” (113), the Magistrate seems implicitly aware that in a binary system which allows only for a hierarchical relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed, he is on the side of the former. This is the “shame of office” (139) he bears as an administrator of the state; he is becoming conscious of his complicity with the Empire, expressed in his fervent desire not to be associated with this regime: “I must assert my distance from Colonel Joll! I will not suffer for his crimes!” (44); he walks away from the spectacle of public violence in the barracks square to not be “contaminated by the atrocity”: “Let it at the very least be said … that in this farthest outpost of the Empire of light there existed one man who in his heart was not a barbarian” (104).
The Magistrate’s emotional reaction at realising his own privileging in a system he despises is similar to Krog’s shame and anger when confronted with the white, Afrikaner members of the security forces at a TRC amnesty hearing:
It’s them! It’s truly them … I go cold with recognition… 
Aversion. I want to distance myself.
They are nothing to me.
I am not of them.
I find myself overcome with anger. Anger for being caught up in their mess. (90-92)
She asks the Commission to interview them to find out, “what do I have in common with the men I hate the most?” The answer lies in an English-speaking colleague’s observation that Krog’s “whole body language and tone of voice change” when she speaks to them: “‘there is a definite intimacy.’” Krog realizes that she shares a culture with them, that during their interaction she used “all the codes I grew up with” (92). For Teresa Dovey, the Magistrate’s attachment to the barbarian girl-as-victim demonstrates the liberal humanist consciousness’s desire “to register its distance from a system which has rendered it quite impotent, to ‘save’ itself of being accused of complicity within the system” (“Writing in the Middle Voice” 23). “‘This is not what you think it is,’” the Magistrate tells the barbarian girl, only to reflect in disgust, “Can I really be about to excuse myself?” The girl does not respond: “Her lips are clenched shut, her ears too no doubt, she wants nothing of old men and their bleating consciences” (27). The girl puts this construction into question, refusing to play to the role of the victim: she “detects” and “rejects” the “spirit of lugubrious sensual pity” (135) in which he approaches her and refuses to disclose the details of her torture. The barbarian girl’s refusal of this interpellation is crucial in the Magistrate’s realization that his desire for the girl’s recognition and thus legitimization of his implicit claim to an identity as a benevolent caretaker is not all that dissimilar to the Empire that tortures to have its power acknowledged. In answer to his questions to the barbarian girl, “‘What do I have to do to move you?’” and “‘Does no one move you?’” the Magistrate sees only his “doubled image” (44) cast back at him in the reflection of Colonel Joll’s sunglasses. This repeats his earlier insight, upon taking in the barbarian girl, that the “distance between myself and her torturers … is negligible” (27).
Towards the end of the novel, the Magistrate reflects, “For I was not, as I liked to think, the indulgent pleasure-loving opposite of the cold rigid Colonel. I was the lie that Empire tells itself when times are easy, he the truth that Empire tells when harsh winds blow. Two sides of imperial rule, no more, no less” (135). The lie of Empire is the presentation of its right to power as an unassailable truth. In easy times, Empire nurtures its subjects – it promises to keep them safe; in difficult times, it claims legitimacy to exert force against those who question this authority. Both lies preserve the self-interest of the state. Earlier, without realising its implications, the Magistrate likens this relationship to that between parents and a child who has transgressed. Comforting the young boy, one of Colonel Joll’s first torture victims, he reflects, “I cannot pretend to be any better than a mother comforting a child between his father’s spells of wrath. It has not escaped me that an interrogator can wear two masks, speak with two voices, one harsh, one seductive” (7). 
The Magistrate’s increasing awareness of his own role as a complicit subject of Empire (Watson’s “reluctant colonial”) underscores my earlier claim that Waiting for the Barbarians can be read as an examination of the relation between power and its subjects beyond the categories of self and other. This is an issue Coetzee returns to again and again in his fiction: in Diary of a Bad Year, the narrator, J. C., writes about “ordinary” people’s longing “for relief from incessant prevarication” from their leaders; “declarations that are never quite the truth.…” He questions whether this hunger can be satisfied by the writer whose access to the facts is not only mediated “within the political field of forces,” but who is also “because of his vocation as much interested in the liar and the psychology of the lie as the truth” (126). Coetzee’s concern is not with the truth of the realities of the state’s others who finds themselves in the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of what Agamben calls the “sovereign ban,” but rather with the forces that determine the lives and relations of subjects within an authoritarian society.
In Waiting for the Barbarians, the Magistrate thus engages in a profound interrogation of his own subjectivity as constituted by Empire,​[13]​ a questioning that is not without its consequences. “For the ‘I’ to launch its critique,” Butler writes in The Psychic Life of Power, “it must first understand that the ‘I’ itself is dependent upon its complicitous desire for the law to make possible its own existence.” If we yield to the subordination required by the law in order to maintain our social identity, then a “critical review of the law” will not undo “the force of conscience” – the desire to respond to the call of the law – “unless the one who offers that critique is willing … to be undone by the critique that he or she performs” (108). “[W]ithout denying complicity in the law that we oppose,” Butler asks, is there “a possibility of being elsewhere or otherwise?” (130). Interpellation, after all, takes place through language and as such is vulnerable to iterability: a critical desubjectivation, the “willingness not to be” … “in order to expose the law as less powerful than its seems,” she argues, would thus entail a different kind of response to the interpellative call, “a different kind of turn, one that, enabled by the law, turns away from the law, resisting its lure of identity, an agency that outruns and counters the conditions of its emergence” (130).
Unlike Colonel Joll, presented to the reader as the inscrutable face and unquestioning agent of power, the Magistrate does not simply accept the monologic discourse of Empire; he enters into a dialogue with it, as suggested by his opening remark regarding the Colonel’s sunglasses: “Is he blind?” (1). While he does not receive any response from the state, trying to subdue his irritation at the Colonel’s “cryptic silences” (4), he starts to question his own relation with the other, represented by both Colonel Joll and the barbarian girl. Despite his desire for “peace, perhaps even peace at any price” (14) and his initial imperviousness to Empire’s transgressions, he sets out to discover the reality of the state’s practices hidden underneath the euphemisms of its security discourse, to find out “what the word investigations meant, what lay beneath it like a banshee beneath a stone” (9).
A pivotal moment in the Magistrate’s awakening to the normative horizon of Empire takes place when he goes hunting one winter’s morning. He comes across a waterbuck: 
My pulse does not quicken: evidently it is not important to me that the ram die … I find an obscure sentiment lurking at the edge of my consciousness. With the buck before me suspended in immobility, there seems to be time for all things, time even to turn my gaze inward and see what it is that has robbed the hunt of its savour: the sense that this has become no longer a morning’s hunting but an occasion on which either the proud ram bleeds to death on the ice or the old hunter misses his aim; that for the duration of this frozen moment the stars are locked in a configuration in which events are not themselves but stand for other things. Behind my paltry cover I stand trying to shrug off this irritating and uncanny feeling…. (39-40)
For Boletsi, in this scene the Magistrate “transgresses the binary colonial logic of hunters and targets” and experiences “the freedom and terror of an ontological dislocation”: “The realization that there are other ways of viewing the world opens the way for an interrogation and revision of the fixed categories on which the Magistrate’s life had been built” (78-79). Boletsi accurately portrays this incident as critical in the Magistrate’s progression to a relation with the other that exceeds the determinisms of Empire; however, there is no suggestion that the Magistrate achieves freedom, or absolute deterritorialization, from the state’s constructions of civilized and barbarian. Rather, a fundamental aspect of the change in the Magistrate’s relation to the other contained in the scene is his insight into how Empire constructs, or “writes,” the identity of its subjects. Typically, this is read as the state’s construction of otherness, that is, the barbarians, but it also includes Colonel Joll and the Magistrate himself. The Magistrate is unsettled by the realization, as he tells the barbarian girl that evening, “‘Never before have I had the feeling of not living my own life on my own terms’” (40; my emphasis). 
Intriguingly, Emanuela Tegla reads this scene as the moral awakening of the Magistrate, confronted with a situation in which “one either does what one is supposed to do (you go hunting, therefore you kill),” or one recognizes “the vulnerable position the other is in (the other being an animal or human being)” and walks away. For Tegla, who draws an equivalence between “one individual having power over an other, power that enables him to do what he wants” and the hunter’s relationship to a prey animal, the conclusion is the same: “the decision [to ‘kill or miss’] is in the hands of the person in power” (75).​[14]​ Put in the same situation, it is made clear, Colonel Joll would have fulfilled his duty as a hunter: in their conversation about this pursuit in the opening scenes of the novel, the Magistrate invites him to experience “native ways of trapping … ‘an experience not to be missed,’” whereas the Colonel gives an account of “the last great drive he rode in, when thousands of deer, pigs, bears were slain, so many that a mountain of carcasses had to be left to rot” (1), foreshadowing their different approaches to the barbarians. However, like Boletsi, Tegla disregards the subject’s interpellation by the discourses of Empire. In other words, both the idea of duty and the opposition to what that entails are conditioned by power.
While this hunting scene, then, takes place in nature, outside the walls of the outpost, this is not the nature of the “pastoral model,” a dream that is “no longer viable” as Coetzee is careful to point out (interview with Scott 96). As his narrator, J. C. in Diary of a Bad Year writes, “The option is not open to us to change our minds, to decide that the monopoly on the exercise of force held by the state, codified in the law, is not what we wanted after all, that we would prefer to go back to a state of nature. We are born subject” (4). For Agamben too, in his reading of Hobbes, the originary political act is not a contract that marks the passage from nature to the state. Rather, he argues, “Far from being a prejuridical condition that is indifferent to the law of the city, the Hobbesian state of nature is the exception and the threshold that constitutes and dwells within it” (Homo Sacer 106). The state of nature, represented in the figure of the homo sacer, or bare life, always-already appears as the state of exception in the sovereign ban; to the extent that politics is always biopolitics, and the law retains a relationship even with those banned from its protection, it is not possible for either the Magistrate or J. C. to withdraw from sovereignty and escape to a state of nature. 
A Future Community
However, the Magistrate’s journey to return the barbarian girl to her people represents a fundamental challenge to Empire’s state of exception. Unlike the identity politics of Colonel Joll and his colleagues, he concedes power in his relation with the barbarians. For the first time, he meets “northerners on their own grounds and on equal terms” (72), crossing the “limits of Empire” (70) in which no such equal relation is possible. This subversion of Empire’s sovereignty – Agamben famously draws on Carl Schmitt’s definition of the sovereign as “he who decides on the state of exception” (State of Exception 1) – also shows the limits of the power he wields as an agent of Empire. He has sovereign power only when he acts in accordance with the state’s aims. The meeting with the barbarians results in his torture at the hand of the Third Bureau; like the former, he finds himself an abandoned subject, no longer enjoying the protections of the law. The Magistrate’s misrecognition of himself in the call of a law that requires the torture and mistreatment of the barbarians, suggests a failure of interpellation and the temporary loss of his social position as a Magistrate. More significantly, however, this failure and the possibility of action in contradiction to the codes of Empire also resist the totalizing reduction of identity performed by the law, marking, as Butler writes about the notion of a critical desubjectivation, “the path toward a more open, even more ethical, kind of being, one of or for the future” (131). 
It is worth noting Butler’s emphasis on ethical being as a future promise of a critical desubjectivation, as it suggests that both authoritarianism’s agents and its others find themselves irrevocably trapped in the biopolitical order. In Waiting for the Barbarians, the Magistrate’s desire to “live outside history,” “outside the history that Empire imposes on its subjects, even its lost subjects” (154), is ultimately doomed to failure. He realizes, “we wake up to [the world as it stands] ineluctably”; “we can neither forget it nor dispense with it.” In other words, while he recognizes that the world created by Empire is an “illusion,” an “evil dream of a night” (143), he is also unable to imagine a life for himself beyond its borders. This is perhaps intimated by the Magistrate’s awareness that all his escape fantasies would result in an inevitable death. It is not clear whether this is the real death of the individual or the death of the Magistrate as subject of the Empire: “I am not unaware of what such daydreams signify, dreams of becoming an unthinking savage, of taking the cold road back to the capital, of groping my way out to the ruins in the desert, of returning to the confinement of my cell, of seeking out the barbarians and offering myself to them to use as they wish. Without exception they are dreams of ends: dreams not of how to live but of how to die” (133).
On the one hand, he is not fully convinced that a barbarian army is not amassing – perhaps based on his knowledge of the Empire’s incursions on their land; on the other hand, he finds “it as hard as ever to believe that the end is near” (143). The Magistrate occupies an ambivalent space, oscillating between his (secure) identity as an official of the Empire and the critical instability caused by his aversion to what that entails. He abandons his attempt to write a record of life at the outpost, which he writes in the form of a pastoral idyll - “‘No one who paid a visit to this oasis … failed to be struck by the charm of life here … We would have made any concession, had we only known what, to go on living here. This was paradise on earth’” – identifying his message as “devious … equivocal … reprehensible” because he cannot quite “abandon the locutions of a civil servant” (154).​[15]​ The Magistrate repeats the phrase, “I think” – which can be read as an attempt to formulate a statement of identity (or subject position) – five times in succession in the last pages of the novel, alternating between the expressed wish to live outside the constructions and meanings of the Empire and the conviction that the barbarians will be “won over to our ways” if they taste “new bread and mulberry jam” (155). The repetition reveals both the desire and the failure to achieve a subject position outside the discourses of Empire. 
However, Coetzee stages the ethical possibilities of admitting subjectiveness in constructing otherness or the other as an object of knowledge in the scene where Colonel Joll attempts to force the Magistrate into acknowledging complicity with the barbarians and their supposed uprising. Significantly, the Magistrate’s open-ended readings are opposed to the very definitive responses he seeks from the barbarian girl early in the novel. Colonel Joll’s interpretation of the wooden slips as mere gambling sticks is an example of interpellative reading – deciding in advance, according to codes embedded in the Empire’s discourse of power. The Magistrate, on the other hand, acknowledges that he has “no idea” (110) what the markings on the poplar slips stand for and proceeds to claim a multiplicity of meanings. He cites examples, such as a “domestic journal,” or “a plan of war” or as “a history of the last years of the Empire” (112). David Attwell claims that the multiplicity of readings put forward by the Magistrate asserts “the open-endedness of the script” and the “indeterminacy of signification” in a strategic reading “aimed at undermining Joll’s terroristic drive for certainty, for truth” (J. M. Coetzee 77-78). Indeed, sovereign power operates through inclusion and exclusion: it encodes contingency into “known units of knowledge,” or totalizes it, and silences any recognition of alterity. When the Magistrate accuses Joll of being the cause of the conflict, his appeal “‘History will bear me out!’” is rejected by the Colonel: “‘You want to go down in history as a martyr, I suspect. But who is going to put you in the history books? These border troubles are of no significance … People are not interested in the history of the back of the beyond … There will be no history, the affair is too trivial’” (114). Furthermore, Colonel Joll denies the Magistrate’s authority as speaking subject by assigning to him the same status as the barbarians. He tries to define him as an objective enemy, declaring, “‘You seem to want to make a name for yourself as the One Just Man, the man who is prepared to sacrifice his freedom to his principles … Believe me, to people in this town you are not the One Just Man, you are simply a clown, a madman. You are dirty, you stink, they can smell you a mile away’” (113-114).
This is reminiscent of the encounter in Coetzee’s The Master of Petersburg during which Dostoyevsky confronts Councillor Maximov about his failure to read Pavel’s papers: “‘They will tell you nothing about why intelligent young men fall under the sway of evildoers. And they will tell you least of all because clearly you do not know how to read. All the time you were reading my son’s story – let me say this – I noticed how you were holding yourself at a distance, erecting a barrier of ridicule, as though the words might leap out from the page and strangle you’” (46). Maximov is reading the papers to affirm his already-held belief that Pavel fell under the influence of the Nechaevites, whereas Dostoyevsky is advocating reading as surrendering to the text: “‘Let me tell you then: reading is being the arm and being the axe and being the skull; reading is giving yourself up, not holding yourself at a distance and jeering” (47). As Attridge points out, Maximov is right in stating that Dostoyevsky speaks “of reading as though it were demon-possession” (47), since reading, and writing, “in full responsiveness to the other is a kind of madness” (J. M. Coetzee 134). The Magistrate’s allegorical reading of the poplar slips thus contests Colonel Joll’s act of foreclosure; it suggests an understanding of the subject not contained by the encodings of the dominant discourse. Like Dostoyevsky, he suggests that Colonel Joll opens himself up to an experience of history-as-alterity. He tells him that he can dig anywhere to uncover “reminders of the dead”: “‘Also the air: the air is full of sighs and cries. These are never lost: if you listen carefully, with a sympathetic ear, you can hear them echoing forever within the second sphere … like their writings, [their cries] are open to many interpretations’” (112; my emphasis).​[16]​ Not only will Empire thus not have the last word on its subjects, but the Magistrate’s readings suggest the possibilities of a different response to the call of the law. 
In an article on the successes and failures of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Aletta Norval affirms the value of “full disclosure” – “the widest possible compilation of experiences, perceptions, stories, myths” – through which “justice as acknowledgement” can be attained (254). The Magistrate’s articulation of the excesses of violence of Empire, like the Commission’s attempts to give voice to those who suffered the horrors of the apartheid regime, acts as a crucial counterpoint to the government’s politics of exclusion. As Butler writes about the American media’s silence on the suffering of Arab peoples in the war on terror, “Those who remain faceless or whose faces are represented to us as so many symbols of evil, authorize us to become senseless before those lives we have eradicated, and whose grievability is indefinitely postponed” (Precarious Life xix). In one of the Magistrate’s readings, a putative barbarian mother writes to a sibling, telling him/her, “‘The soldiers came and took your brother away. I have been to the fort every day to plead for his return. I sit in the dust with my head bare.’” The mother then goes to retrieve the body, but she fears that she might have been given the wrong one – “‘You have so many bodies here, bodies of brave young men’” (111). There is, however, no record of what happened to him: “‘I do not know,’ said the man, ‘it is not on the paper’” (111); these deaths are not worth recording. In creating a scene of mourning and loss, the Magistrate is forging a space for the recognition of a common humanity with the barbarians.
Ultimately, however, the Magistrate, Colonel Joll, and the barbarian girl are kept radically separate by their respective encodings in the discourses of the state, again demonstrating the productive role of power in the constitution of its subjects. Empire relies on this oppositional relationship; in fact, through the violence imbedded in laws, such as those that produced apartheid, and perpetrated in the torture chamber, the state destroys the possibility of justice and community between its subjects.​[17]​ This brings to mind Arendt’s observation on the functioning of totalitarianism: “It has frequently been observed that terror can rule absolutely only over men who are isolated against each other and that, therefore, one of the primary concerns of all tyrannical government is to bring this isolation about. Isolation may be the beginning of terror; it certainly is its most fertile ground; it always is its result” (474). The arbitrariness of justice in the Empire, torturing innocent victims identified as the “objective enemy” of the state, has the potential to turn the Magistrate “into a creature that believes in nothing” (81). He reflects on the effect of violence on the barbarian girl, but it can also be read as prescience as to the outcome of his own suffering at the hands of Colonel Joll: “Thereafter, she was no longer fully human, sister to all of us. Certain sympathies died, certain movements of the heart became no longer possible to her” (81).​[18]​ The borders the state erects between its subjects prohibit any productive form of communication and shared understanding with the other. 
Although there is little indication of an actual change in the relations between the Empire and the barbarians at the end of the novel, other critics like Stef Craps notes that a “rapprochement with the other has been powerfully enacted in [the Magistrate’s] dreams” (65-66) in which the barbarian girl is represented by a hooded figure. Significantly, his dream experiences evolve concurrently with his relinquishing his position in the world of Empire. In the first few dreams, he is unable to “imagine the face between the petals of her peaked hood but cannot” (10); when he does sees her face it “is blank, featureless” (37). After speaking out against the treatment of the barbarians, the Magistrate is granted sight for the first time, and his gaze is reciprocated by the figure in the dream: the girl “appears as herself, herself as I have never seen her, a smiling child, the light sparkling on her teeth and glancing from her jet-black eyes. ‘So this is what it is to see! I say to myself’” (53, my emphasis). In the final enactment of this sequence – which takes place after he returns the girl to her people – the figure offers him “a loaf of bread, still hot, with a coarse steaming broken crust” (109). In the closing moments of the novel, the Magistrate comes across a group of children building a snowman in the barracks yard, but this is not the scene he dreamt of. For Craps, this ending holds out “the promise of an ethical future” (66), while Attwell suggests that the children “represent a future community” (J. M. Coetzee 87); however, even as this scene suggests an opening to a future beyond the borders of Empire, the Magistrate leaves it “feeling stupid, like a man who lost his way long ago but presses on along a road that may lead nowhere” (156).
For the reader of Waiting for the Barbarians, the ending of the novel is left challengingly open: the author does not answer the questions he raised as to the Magistrate’s inability to fully comprehend the barbarian girl, nor is there a vindication of justice in the defeat of Colonel Joll and the Civil Guard. However, considering that Coetzee does not see himself as a writer in opposition and, furthermore, questions the very ability of art to affect history, this seems to be the point.​[19]​ For state power to work, it has to create and maintain criteria for identity and belonging to justify its politics of inclusion and exclusion and the state of exception. While the Magistrate therefore powerfully realizes his own and the barbarians’ interpellation in the Empire’s discourses, he does not (in fact, he is not able to) construct an identity for himself, for the barbarians, or for Colonel Joll outside of the determinations of this framework; the novel only hints at the possibility of a future ethical interaction of which the Magistrate will probably not be a part. As Coetzee reveals, “there is a very strong presence of children in [Waiting for the Barbarians] and there is no saying – although the book doesn’t deal directly with it – what those children might do and what sort of life they might lead” (interview with Rhedin).
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^1	  Most notably, Derek Attridge’s J. M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading explores ideas of alterity and responsibility toward the other in Coetzee’s oeuvre, also examined by Mike Marais in his essays on otherness and ethics. See, for example, the latter’s “Waiting for the Barbarians (1980).” Carrol Clarkson’s “J. M. Coetzee and the Limits of Language” is particularly incisive on the novel’s challenge to the limits of discourse and its homogenising effects.
^2	  I would like to thank the journal’s anonymous reviewer for referring me to this article.
^3	  As this article draws on both Agamben’s notion of the state of exception and Butler’s idea of a critical desubjectivation, it is important to note the differences in these writers’ respective responses to Michel Foucault’s notion of biopolitics. In her essay “Indefinite Detention” (in Precarious Life), Butler is critical of Agamben’s failure to account for power’s differential functioning in targeting specific populations in its definition of a state of exception in the name of security; she thus deems his categories too general to be politically effective. Verena Erlenbusch makes a similar claim when she writes, “Agamben’s analysis stops short of going behind the manifestation of power in order to explain the ways in which similar techniques of power are deployed in different contexts, for different reasons, and with different intentions” (51). Butler expands on Agamben’s definition (in turn, drawing on Carl Schmitt) of the sovereign as he who decides on the state of exception by examining the sovereignty that emerges as an effect of the suspension of the law (see my use of her notion of governmentality). Her arguments thus reflect a more sensitive reading of Foucault’s notion of the modern operations of power as myriad and dispersed. (For an analysis of Agamben’s and Butler’s respective interpretations – and in the case of Butler, also anticipation – of Foucault’s thinking, see Erlenbusch’s “The Place of Sovereignty: Mapping Power with Agamben, Butler, and Foucault.”)
^4	  Spencer’s claim is based, in part, on Loomba et al.’s assertion, in a recent anthology of postcolonial criticism, that “the shadow the 2003 US invasion casts on the twenty-first century makes it more absurd than ever to speak of ours as a postcolonial world. On the other hand, the signs of galloping US imperialism make the agenda of postcolonial studies more necessary than ever” (qtd. in Spencer 176).
^5	  Comparing the Empire in Waiting for the Barbarians to this most modern expression of warfare could not have been anticipated by the initial reviewers in South African newspapers who rather saw parallels between the Third Bureau and the South African Security Police, the KGB and the Gestapo [see, for example, “SA Writer” in The Natal Witness (21); “Rev.” in The Star (4); “Underlying Melancholy” in The Cape Times (8); and Woodley in the Sunday Express (23)]. Others added Rome and Tsarist and Soviet Russia to the list [see Levin in The Argus (12); Tucker in Pretoria News (12)]. The writer of Frontline’s “Books” section raised the spectre of the South African Security Police’s notorious unaccountability and mused about asking Coetzee to what extent his novel was inspired by “the stories of the Bikos and the Timols and the Imam Harouns, to what extent his cold vicious Colonel Joll is an image of those identifiable local characters who get cleared of complicity in inquest courts” (15). Bernard Levin of The Argus concluded cynically that “There is one thing [Coetzee] makes clear though. That is whoever The Barbarians might be an analogy for – Blacks, Indians, Heathens, Catholics, Moslems [are] whichever set of outcasts from whatever period of man’s prejudice you care to select” (12). Levin’s comment points to the crucial feature of the state of exception: the government’s definition of the enemy-of-the-state. (I would like to thank Crystal Warren, the curator of the National English Literary Museum in Grahamstown, South Africa, for her generous assistance in accessing these newspaper reports.)
^6	  Extract from a speech during the Cape National Party Congress at East London on 3 September 1975.
^7	  The Empire’s identity, its authority and power, is indeed based on maintaining the oppositional binary of civilized/barbarian. It is my contention that Coetzee here is shifting the focus towards Empire’s endgame, what it would do to maintain the supposed legitimacy of its rule. Other critics, however, have explored the construction of this binary with admirable scope. Maria Boletsi, in her comparative study of the novel and Cavafy’s poem, argues that “In this opposition, the notion of barbarian operates as the constitutive outside of civilization and feeds the superiority of the civilized … the term barbarian entails a collective construction of the other in a way that helps define the civilized subject itself – by specifying its negative limits” (68). In Waiting for the Barbarians, the Empire is civilized because the “barbarian way” is written as consisting of “intellectual torpor, slovenliness, tolerance of disease and death” (52). Significantly also for the aim of this essay, it is worth repeating that the fixed identities of both the civilized subject and the barbarian as having positive or negative attributes in this discourse depend on sustaining this opposition; the value is not inherent in these categories themselves.
^8	  In a subversive gesture undermining a cohesive reading of his text, Coetzee also names the cook, Mai, towards the end of the novel. However, this could be indicative of the change in the Magistrate’s relationship towards power in the second half of the novel.
^9	  Here the novel again renders overt the connection between the state of exception and the authoritarian regime’s desire to claim legitimacy; in other words, its right to maintain – rather than gain – power. Only in totalitarianism’s initial stages, when a struggle for power is still going on, Arendt argues, are the victims of the secret police “those who can be suspected of opposition” (The Origins 432).
^10	  This is also true of the victim of violence: Agamben cites Primo Levi’s description of the person who in camp jargon was called der Muselmann (‘the Muslim’), “a being from whom humiliation, horror, and fear had so taken away all consciousness and all personality as to make him absolutely apathetic (hence the ironical name given to him) … He no longer belongs to the world of men in any way...” (Homo Sacer 185).
^11	  The novel could thus be read as staging the political power of naming that “continues to force itself upon you, to delineate the space you occupy, to construct a social positionality” (Butler, Excitable Speech 33).
^12	  The military order issued by the President of the United States on 13 November 2001, “which authorized the ‘indefinite detention’ and trial by ‘military commissions’ (not to be confused with the military tribunals provided for by the law of war) of noncitizens suspected of involvement in terrorist activities,” radically erased the legal status of these detainees, “thus producing a legally unnameable and unclassifiable being” (Agamben, State of Exception 3). 
^13	  In his essay “Coetzee’s Estrangements,” Attwell argues that a “consistent premise of Coetzee’s writing is that you do not choose your history; it chooses you. The given historical situation is a confinement: one exercises restricted options and longs to exercise others” (232). This is true of the writer’s own experience “of having South Africanness in various forms (as a legal structure of citizenship, an historical identity, as well as the cultural edifice of being a South African writer) forced upon him by an accident of birth” (232). Consequently, Attwell suggests, Coetzee employs strategies of “fictive displacement” and “imaginative relocation” in his writing to enact an estrangement with this determining context. While Attwell references Life & Times of Michael K, and the protagonist’s “efforts to remain free and unobserved in a landscape that has been completely mapped, fenced and policed” (233), as an example of this condition that affects Coetzee as an author, it also rings true of the narrator of Waiting for the Barbarians. 
^14	  There is an obvious resonance here with Foucault’s definition of sovereign power as “the right to take life or let live” (A History of Sexuality 136). The decision-making of, respectively, the Magistrate and the Colonel is thus indicative of their positions of power not only in this hunting scenario, but also within Empire in general; furthermore, it is arguably also illustrative of Butler’s notion of governmentality.
^15	  Dovey identifies in the Magistrate’s narration “the failure of liberal humanism to see itself as discourse” failing to “account for the way in which the meanings it constructs are contingent upon a specific interpretative framework” and as a corollary to this, “its failure to see itself as located in history, inevitably contributing to it while being overtaken by it” (“Allegory of Allegories” 143). But the Magistrate’s failures of reading and writing are not the result of a lack of insight into his own historical and discursive position; they are the consequences of the impossibility of achieving an extra-discursive or extra-historical stance. 
^16	  In The Singularity of Literature, Attridge writes, “Not all works will have something to offer to a reader’s openness to alterity, of course, but when one does, mechanical and instrumental interpretation is complicated by what we may term readerly hospitality, a readiness to have one’s purposes reshaped by the work to which one is responding” (80). 
^17	 12 Coetzee argues that for any form of “lasting community” to exist you need an “awareness of an idea of justice, somewhere, that transcends laws and lawmaking” (interview with Attwell 340).
^18	  Pain excludes to the extent that the torture victim can focus only on the body and its survival. The Magistrate reflects on this during his own incarceration and torture: “If I was the object of an injustice, a minor injustice, when they locked me in here, I am now no more than a pile of blood, bone and meat that is unhappy” (85).Elaine Scarry’s thinking explains the “absolute incompatibility of pain and the world” (50); she writes, “It is the intense pain that destroys a person’s self and world, a destruction experienced spatially as either the contraction of the universe down to the immediate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling to fill the entire universe. Intense pain is also language-destroying: as the content of one’s world disintegrates, so the content of one’s language disintegrates; as the self disintegrates, so that which would express and project the self is robbed of its source and its subject” (35).
^19	  In “Emerging from Censorship,” Coetzee debunks what he sees as Mario Vargas Llosa’s argument that the revolutionary writer can oppose the tyrant without being trapped in a system of oppositions; that is, “true opposition consists in being in opposition to systems of opposition.” For Coetzee, Vargas Llosa’s claim “that the writer occupies a position that simultaneously exists outside politics, rivals politics, and dominates politics” is “truly megalomaniac” (48).
